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BEYOND SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL 
TREATMENT 
Frank J. Garcia*
Abstract: Developing country concern over ºawed special and differential 
treatment (S&D) provisions has already contributed to the failed Seattle 
and Cancún WTO Ministerial Meetings. In order to succeed, the current 
WTO Doha Development Round must go beyond simply reforming 
existing S&D provisions, important as that is. Developing countries must 
re-focus WTO trade and development policy around the twin goals of 
development and fairness. Developing countries need a comprehensive 
agreement on S&D clarifying that development, not trade liberalization, is 
the number one economic policy goal of developing countries, and that 
fairness, not charity, is the basis for development. Such an agreement 
should also establish adequate domestic policy space for minimally-
distorting development policies; create binding and unconditional 
preferential market access; provide adequate time to implement complex 
new trade agreements; create truly “precise, effective and operational” 
S&D provisions; and adequately fund technical assistance. 
Introduction 
 The current Doha Development Round of World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) negotiations has, for the moment, focused the interna-
tional trade community’s attention on special and differential treat-
ment (S&D). S&D is a category of measures through which developed 
countries respond to the particular risks and vulnerabilities that devel-
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oping countries face in international trade.1 In its contemporary form, 
S&D has three main elements: market access, market protection, and 
technical assistance. The market access element recognizes that devel-
oped countries can support the economic development of developing 
countries by allowing them to export at preferential rates into their lar-
ger markets. The market protection aspect is essentially the principle of 
nonreciprocity, which recognizes that developed countries should not 
expect equivalent access or equivalent concessions in return. The pro-
vision of technical assistance recognizes that states rich in trade-related 
knowledge, and the resources to pay for it, should share that knowl-
edge and ªnancially support its implementation. 
 Although S&D has, in some form or another, been around since 
the 1950s, the 1986–1993 Uruguay Round was a watershed in the his-
tory of S&D and, more generally, in the relationship between develop-
ing countries and the multilateral trading system. The full effects of 
the changes wrought by the Uruguay Round, further discussed below, 
were not immediately understood. However, by the time of the failed 
Seattle Ministerial in 1999, there was a widespread sense among de-
veloping countries that S&D, and the Uruguay Round more generally, 
had failed to live up to their promise, and that the post-Uruguay 
Round system was not resulting in the sort of economic welfare gains 
developing countries had anticipated and bargained for.2
 The 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration3 and the related Doha De-
cision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns4 are intended 
to articulate the resolve of WTO Members to reform S&D as part of a 
comprehensive effort to respond to developing country concerns. 
Commentators have already expressed a degree of skepticism as to 
whether the Uruguay Round is indeed about development at all.5 The 
regrettable collapse of the Cancún Ministerial6 could either be a con-
ªrmation of this skepticism, or merely a stage towards eventual suc-
                                                                                                                      
1 On these risks and vulnerabilities, see generally Frank J. Garcia, Trade Inequality 
and Justice (2003); Dermot McCann, Small States in Globalizing Markets: The End of National 
Economic Sovereignty?, 34 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 281 (2001). 
2 See Dilip K. Das, Debacle at Seattle: The Way the Cookie Crumbled, 34 J. World Trade 181, 
190–93 (2000) (discussing factors contributing to Seattle failure). 
3 WTO Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/ 
DEC/1 (Nov. 20, 2001) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. 
4 WTO Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, Implementation-Related Issues and Con-
cerns, WT/MIN(01)/17 (Nov. 20, 2001) [hereinafter Implementation Decision]. 
5 See, e.g., Raj Bhala, Poverty, Islam and Doha: Unmet Challenges Facing American Trade 
Law, 36 Int’l Law. 159, 165–67 and sources cited therein (2002). 
6 The WTO Under Fire, The Economist, Sept. 20, 2003, at 26–28. 
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cess—only time will tell.  Either way, this is a historic and risky moment 
for developing countries, and we are not likely to see another “devel-
opment” round in the near future. Thus, the stakes are high for devel-
oping countries to make the most of this one. What will this require? 
 For developing countries to emerge from the Round in a sub-
stantially stronger position, they must go beyond contemporary S&D 
in three ways, which will be discussed in Part II, sections A–C of this 
Article. First, developing countries must shift the terms of the trade 
and development debate away from the current emphasis on extra 
“adjustment” time and back towards a fundamental commitment to a 
paradigm of development and fairness, with trade policy a servant of 
both. Second, the WTO must address the shortcomings in the core 
policies of S&D: market access, market protection, and technical assis-
tance. Third, the WTO must close up the many loopholes in existing 
S&D provisions by substituting justiciable language for aspirational 
language and engaging in the political negotiations this requires. Be-
fore turning to these three reform areas, an outline of the Uruguay 
Round and the development of S&D will be presented in Part I. 
I. S&D and the Uruguay Round 
 In order to understand the changes and problems wrought by 
the Uruguay Round, it is important to understand some of the history 
of S&D, speciªcally its introduction and development during the era 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
A. S&D in the GATT 
 In the beginning, there was no special and differential treatment.7 
In the GATT of 1947, developing country members participated in 
GATT disciplines on an essentially equal basis and had to justify re-
course to any nontariff barriers according to standard GATT principles 
and provisions.8
                                                                                                                      
7 Prior to the beginning of GATT negotiations in 1946, there was no mention of S&D 
in any trade agreement. Robert E. Hudec, GATT and the Developing Countries, 1992 Colum. 
Bus. L. Rev. 67, 68 (1992). Although developing countries participated in the Havana 
negotiations, there was no formal recognition of them as a group or of their special needs 
in the eventual GATT 1947 text. Constantine Michalopoulos, The Role of Special 
and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries in GATT and the World 
Trade Organization 2–3 (World Bank, Pol’y Res. Working Paper Series No. 2388, 2000). 
8 See Hudec, supra note 7, at 69 (“minimal” recognition of S&D in GATT 1947 was of 
“little practical value”). GATT Article XVIII did allow exceptions for support of developing 
industries, but the provisions were not unique to developing countries and required prior 
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 Two related factors changed this situation: the growth of devel-
opment economics and the decolonization movement. First, econo-
mists studying the trade relationships between richer and poorer 
states highlighted the particular risks and vulnerabilities that smaller 
economies face in trade.9 Second, the decolonization movement re-
sulted in a plethora of poor, newly independent states seeking admis-
sion to the GATT.10
 These twin forces led to a series of development-oriented GATT 
revisions, beginning with the 1955 changes substantially revising Arti-
cle XVIII and introducing Article XXVIIIbis.11 Article XVIII was re-
written to clearly allow developing countries to enact market protec-
tion measures for infant industries and to more easily impose trade 
restrictions in the face of balance of payments problems.12 Article 
XXVIIIbis, drafted to set out a framework for future GATT negotia-
tions,13 stipulates that such negotiations take into account “the needs 
of less-developed countries for a more ºexible use of tariff protection 
to assist their economic development.”14 Subsequently, in 1964, the 
GATT Contracting Parties15 adopted Part IV, adding a series of non-
binding statements of principle that favored increased trade opportu-
nities for developing countries. 
 The next milestone was the adoption of the Decision of 28 No-
vember 1979 on Differential and More Favorable Treatment, known 
                                                                                                                      
approval. In part for this reason, developing countries made more frequent recourse in 
the early 1950s to balance-of-payments-based exceptions under Article XII, which did not 
require prior approval but were also not speciªcally tailored to developing countries. See 
John H. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT 639 (1969). 
9 Pioneering studies included Jacob Viner, International Trade and Economic De-
velopment 120–50 (1952); Gunnar Myrdal, An International Economy: Problems and 
Prospects (1956); and Albert O. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development 
(1958). 
10 Hudec notes that by 1960 developing country membership in GATT had increased 
by 50%. This accelerated during the 1960s due to the admission of newly independent 
states, so that by 1970 75% of GATT membership consisted of developing countries. 
Hudec, supra note 7, at 70–71. 
11 See generally Jackson, supra note 8, ch. 25. 
12 Id. at 638–40; see also General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. 
XVIII, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. 
13 Jackson, supra note 8, at 221. 
14 GATT, supra note 12, art. XXVIIIbis, para. 3(b). 
15 When GATT parties act ofªcially and in concert, the treaty refers to them as “Con-
tracting Parties.” Philip M. Nichols, GATT Doctrine, 36 Va. J. Int’l L. 379, 390 n.58 (1996) 
(explaining “Contracting Parties”). 
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as the “Enabling Clause.”16 The Enabling Clause became the frame-
work document for trade and development in the GATT and ªrmly 
established the legal basis for the S&D regime.17 The basic approach 
of the Enabling Clause is to promote development by legalizing pref-
erential trade and establishing boundaries that make it possible for 
developing countries to maintain the autonomous domestic policy 
space needed to pursue development policies. 
 The Enabling Clause also authorizes preferential trade through 
the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP),18 which prior to this had 
been pursued under a GATT waiver. The cornerstone of the Enabling 
Clause, however, is the principle of nonreciprocity in trade relations 
between developed and developing countries.19 By virtue of this prin-
ciple and in recognition of their particular development needs and vul-
nerabilities, developing countries would not be expected to make con-
cessions equivalent to those made by developed countries. For 
example, under this principle, developing countries did not have to 
join all 1973–1979 Tokyo Round GATT side agreements (i.e., for subsi-
dies). Developing countries could also maintain different levels of obli-
gation regarding tariff levels, nontariff barriers, and subsidies. Such 
nonreciprocity was deemed essential for ensuring adequate domestic 
policy space for development needs. 
B. The Uruguay Round 
 The Uruguay Round is noteworthy for several well-known reasons, 
such as the strengthening of the trade dispute resolution mechanism 
                                                                                                                      
16 Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of 
Developing Countries (Nov. 28, 1979), GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 203 (1980) [herein-
after Enabling Clause]. 
17 See, e.g., Kele Onyejekwe, International Law of Trade Preferences: Emanations from the 
European Union and the United States, 26 St. Mary’s L.J. 425, 454 (1995) (Enabling Clause 
established permanent legal framework for S&D). 
18 The GSP, or Generalized System Preferences, is a voluntary system of trade prefer-
ences ªrst articulated by the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development. See Hudec, 
supra note 7, at 72. 
19 This expands upon the more limited nonreciprocity cited in Article XXXVI.8 of 
Part IV of the GATT, supra note 12 (“The developed contracting parties do not expect 
reciprocity for commitments made by them in trade negotiations to reduce or remove 
tariffs and other barriers to the trade of less-developed contracting parties.”). Paragraph 5 
of the Enabling Clause, supra note 16,  adds “i.e., the developed countries do not expect 
the developing countries, in the course of trade negotiations, to make contributions which 
are inconsistent with their individual development, ªnancial and trade needs. Developed 
contracting parties shall therefore not seek, neither shall less-developed contracting par-
ties be required to make, concessions that are inconsistent with the latter’s’ development, 
ªnancial and trade needs.” 
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and the creation of the WTO itself. Additionally, from the perspective 
of developing countries, the Uruguay Round is also noteworthy for the 
transformation of S&D through the drastic curtailment of the principle 
of nonreciprocity. 
1. The Uruguay Round and S&D 
 The Uruguay Round altered the reciprocity component of S&D in 
two ways. First, the countries negotiating in the Uruguay Round 
adopted a new single-undertaking approach under which prospective 
WTO members had to agree to virtually all WTO disciplines.20 Although 
this change was largely motivated by nondevelopment concerns, such as 
the notorious “GATT à la carte” phenomenon coming out of the Tokyo 
Round,21 it was to have signiªcant impact on WTO development policy 
as well. Writing before the conclusion of the Round, Hudec was one of 
the few to catch the signiªcance of this change: 
 At the very last minute, the terms of the [developed-
developing country] bargain have further been altered by a 
radical new demand by the developed countries [that a single 
package approach be adopted] . . . . Under this approach, 
governments would have to decide between accepting every-
thing or leaving the GATT. In essence, this new approach 
completely restructures the developed-developing country 
bargain, proposing to pay for all the new developing country 
concessions simply by agreeing not to destroy the market ac-
cess they already have.22
 Second, although the Uruguay Round agreements retained many 
S&D elements,23 these provisions as a whole also reveal a fundamental 
                                                                                                                      
20 The single-undertaking approach did not include plurilateral disciplines in Annex 
IV to the WTO Agreement, such as the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, of interest to 
a small minority of states. 
21 John H. Jackson et al., Legal Problems of International Economic Relations 
214–15 (2002)(discussing Tokyo Round ºaws). 
22 Hudec, supra note 7, at 76. 
23 WTO documents cite the existence of 145 S&D provisions throughout the WTO 
Agreements. The WTO Secretariat has divided these provisions into six categories based 
on their function. See CTD, Implementation of Special and Differential Treatment Provisions in 
WTO Agreements and Decisions, WT/COMTD/W/77 (Oct. 25, 2000) [hereinafter CTD, S&D 
Provisions]. These categories are (paraphrasing slightly): (i) provisions aimed at increasing 
trade opportunities (12); (ii) provisions under which Members should safeguard develop-
ing country interests (49); (iii) provisions offering ºexibility of commitments (30); (iv) 
transitional time periods (18); (v) technical assistance (14); and (vi) provisions relating to 
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shift away from traditional nonreciprocity. Instead of maintaining full 
nonreciprocity of obligation, the system shifted to limited nonrecip-
rocity of implementation.24 Developing countries lost the option of 
maintaining different levels of obligation and instead were granted 
additional periods of time to adjust to the burdens of fully-
implemented WTO obligations. This shift was not entirely a surprise 
to developing countries, which recognized, from their own anemic 
regional trade experiments, the failure of import substitution-style 
integration,25 and they were ready to barter a more limited form of 
nonreciprocity in exchange for better market access in sectors such as 
agriculture and textiles.26 However, this concession was a gamble and 
part of a larger bargain that developing countries sought from devel-
oped countries through the Uruguay Round. 
2. The Grand Bargain Was a Bad Bargain 
 Overall, when one evaluates the Uruguay Round agreements from 
the perspective of developing countries, a system-wide problem that is 
not localized merely to the S&D provisions emerges. The Uruguay 
Round was supposed to be a sort of “grand bargain,” in which the 
wealthier North was supposed to reduce import barriers, especially in 
textiles and agriculture. In exchange, the South agreed to adopt new 
regulations in areas of interest to the North, such as intellectual prop-
erty (IP), subsidies, and services.27
                                                                                                                      
least developed countries (22). These can still be broken down into three main groups: 
market access, market protection, and technical assistance. 
24 See, e.g., Kiichiro Fukasaku, Special and Differential Treatment for Develop-
ing Countries: Does It Help Those Who Help Themselves? (U.N. U. World Inst. for 
Dev. Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 197, 2000) (Uruguay Round marked a “clear depar-
ture” from traditional nonreciprocity approach); McCann, supra note 1, at 291 (Uruguay 
Round signaled “a clear movement away from a permanent lower level of obligation for 
developing states”). 
25 See Michalopoulos, supra note 7, at 9–12 (developing countries were re-thinking 
economic models of trade and development). 
26 See id. at 14 (without formally abandoning the principle of nonreciprocity, develop-
ing countries changed their past approach and increased concessions); Hudec, supra note 
7, at 75–77 (developing countries viewed increased access in key sectors as compensation 
for both Uruguay Round concessions and prior trade liberalization reforms). 
27 See Hudec, supra note 7, at 75–77. See generally Asoke Mukerji, Developing Countries 
and the WTO: Issues of Implementation, 34 J. World Trade 33, 39–64 (2000) (assessing the 
implementation of WTO agreements); Bonapas Onguglo & Taisuke Ito, Proposed Legal 
Regime Within the World Trade Organization on Enhanced Market Access Conditions for Least De-
veloped Countries, in Legal Aspects of International Trade 15 (World Bank ed., 2001), 
available at http://www4.worldbank.org/legal/publications/trade.pdf. 
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 Unfortunately, the results have been one-sided. For example, the 
North has maintained many of its domestic barriers in sectors of in-
terest to developing countries, such as agriculture and textiles.28 This 
failure is particularly disappointing to developing countries because 
the Uruguay Round did succeed in dismantling or phasing out the 
sorts of market protections they had previously maintained against 
overwhelming competition from the North. Indeed, the Uruguay 
Round succeeded in limiting nonreciprocity and restricting ºexibility 
to pursue development-oriented policies such as subsidies. Moreover, 
time has clariªed for developing countries the full extent of the prob-
lem inherent in the language of many S&D commitments. Many of 
the WTO’s 145 S&D provisions were drafted in a “best efforts” style, 
and the results have been disappointing: wealthier states have not de-
livered, and such provisions are not enforceable.29
 These issues reºect a larger problem with the bargain—a general 
asymmetry in costs and beneªts. For developing countries, the costs 
are clear and immediate: the loss of market protections and domestic 
policy space for subsidies, and the adoption of new legal obligations 
are expensive to implement. In contrast, the beneªt of increased ac-
cess and the hope that “best efforts” will indeed be made remain 
speculative and future-oriented.30
 Why did developing countries make such a bad bargain? First, 
since they had not fully participated in prior Rounds, developing 
countries lacked both experience and capacity in WTO negotia-
tions.31 Second, there was a general lack of accurate knowledge as to 
the future effects of policies sought by the wealthier states.32 Third, 
commentators point to an intensiªed mercantilist attitude (our ex-
port interests ªrst) on the part of the United States, the WTO’s major 
power.33 Fourth, the very creation of the WTO put developing coun-
tries over a barrel, because a “no” vote by a developing country  would 
not have preserved the status quo and would have left that country out 
of the new organization.34
                                                                                                                      
28 J. Michael Finger & Julio J. Nogués, The Unbalanced Uruguay Round Out-
come: The New Areas in Future WTO Negotiations 3–4 (World Bank, Pol’y Res. Work-
ing Paper Series No. 2732, 2001) (analyzing agriculture and textile sector results). 
29 Michalopoulos, supra note 7, at 17–18. 
30 See id. at 15. 
31 Finger & Nogués, supra note 28, at 1. 
32 Id. at 12 (reporting scarcity of accurate data on affected sectors). 
33 Id. at 13–14. 
34 Id. at 1. 
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II. Beyond S&D 
 For these reasons, the concession-based, adjustment-oriented 
form of S&D that emerged from the Uruguay Round should not be 
the future of trade and development in the WTO. For developing 
countries, it is necessary in the Doha Round to go beyond the current 
form of S&D in three respects. First, developing countries must shift 
the framework in which S&D is debated, offered, and evaluated, from 
the current paradigm of adjustment and charity to a paradigm of de-
velopment and fairness. Second, the WTO must restore the effectiveness 
of the three fundamental elements of S&D: market access, nonrecip-
rocity, and technical assistance. Finally, the WTO must enforce the 
Uruguay Round bargain by addressing the weaknesses inherent in 
S&D provisions as currently drafted. 
A. Shifting the Paradigm: Development and Fairness 
 When one views the 1986–1993 Uruguay Round, the 1999 Seattle 
Ministerial, and the current Doha Round together, a fundamental 
conºict over paradigms becomes apparent. The Uruguay Round ef-
fected a then-little-understood shift in the paradigm for developing 
countries in trade law, from the development model of the Enabling 
Clause to a new adjustment model. Since the Uruguay Round, the 
model for S&D, and for developed-developing country relations gen-
erally, has been adjustment assistance: extra time or extra help to 
“catch” up to a level playing ªeld. 
 Seattle, Doha, and now Cancún can be seen as responses to the 
problems in this approach that have been recognized over time, as 
the implications of the paradigm shift for developing countries have 
become clearer. The adjustment approach has proven to be inade-
quate because the extra time has not been enough,35 the extra help 
has not been forthcoming,36 and the playing ªeld is not level.37 The 
time bomb built into the limited nonreciprocity model has ticked 
away and is now detonating since implementation periods are expir-
ing, and developing countries are not ready. 
                                                                                                                      
35 See infra Part II.B.2 for a discussion of the inadequacy of current implementation 
periods. 
36 See infra Part II.B.3 for a discussion of the inadequacy of the technical assistance re-
gime. 
37 See infra Part II.B.1 for a discussion of obstacles developed countries have main-
tained to developing country trade. 
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 The problems run deeper, however, than the mere need for extra 
time, real as it may be. There is a need to change the basic model and 
organize the future of trade and development doctrine in the WTO 
on the basis of development and fairness instead of adjustment and 
one-sided liberalization. 
 In a development model, the bottom-line question for the WTO 
should be what it can do to facilitate development, not what it is willing 
to allow to ease adjustment.38 The premise, stated or otherwise, under-
lying the Uruguay Round model is that free trade is development or, at 
least, that free trade is both necessary and sufªcient to ensure devel-
opment. However, this premise has not worked. Free trade may be nec-
essary, but it is not sufªcient, particularly when developing countries 
are at a low level of industrialization and the new WTO regime ad-
vances towards such complex, development-sensitive issues such as in-
vestment and services trade. Even if the WTO system were fair, which it 
is not, competition according to reciprocal trade cannot be fair in view 
of the disparities among the players.39 Although the economic debate 
rages on,40 it seems that purely free trade can never be fair given the 
levels of disparity and market imperfections that exist. 
 Ultimately, a sound trade and development policy for the WTO 
depends upon the evolution of a new consensus in development eco-
nomics. If free trade by itself is an inadequate prescription for devel-
opment, as is suggested by many commentators,41 then WTO policy 
must more fully take into account the ways that free trade can harm 
or retard development. During the GATT regime, it was recognized 
that developing countries had to balance participation in the trade 
liberalization regime with “the requirements of ensuring equitable 
                                                                                                                      
38 See Finger & Nogués, supra note 28, at 1 (“Decisions in the new [WTO agenda] ar-
eas should be structured as development/investment decisions—development issues to 
which a trade dimension can be ªtted, not the other way around.”) (emphasis added). 
39 As one Caribbean trade negotiator has remarked in the author’s presence, the 
Christians and the lions did after all meet on a level playing ªeld in the Coliseum, and we 
all know how that came out. 
40 See, e.g., Jagdish Bhagwati & T.N. Srinivasan, Trade and Poverty in the Poor Countries, 
Am. Econ. Rev. Papers & Proceedings, May 2002, http://www.columbia.edu/~jb38/ 
paper2001/AEA%20Trade%20and%20Poverty%20in%20the%20Poor%20Countries.pdf; 
Bhala, supra note 5, at 168–69 (summarizing economic arguments). 
41 See, e.g., Ha-Joon Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder (2002) (arguing that developed 
economies pursued aggressive industrial policy strategies, including infant industry and ex-
port subsidy measures, in their own development rather than the free trade ideology they 
now espouse); J. Michael Finger & Philip Schuler, Implementation of Uruguay Round 
Commitments: The Development Challenge 25 (World Bank, Pol’y Res. Working Paper 
Series No. 2215, 1999), http://econ.worldbank.org/docs/941.pdf (suggesting that interna-
tional trade negotiations are inappropriate remedies for development issues). 
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socio-economic development, in which the role of the government 
was as important as the role of the market.”42 The new WTO regime 
risks great harm to developing country economies if it maintains an 
ideological stance on free trade, ignoring the need for this balancing 
act.43 Given the disparity in power between states asserting this ideol-
ogy and states complaining of its negative effects, the result can be a 
sort of free trade uber alles, beneªting no one in the long term. 
 Instead, where development needs suggest a deviation from trade 
orthodoxy, a development-oriented WTO will restore the necessary pol-
icy space. The Uruguay Round’s limitation of nonreciprocity has cur-
tailed the domestic policy space needed to facilitate development.44 A 
pro-development WTO will be open to calls to restore, in a prudent 
manner, such domestic policy autonomy. WTO policy with respect to 
developing countries must be pragmatically guided by what actually 
works for developing economies. 
 Second, the WTO must address developing countries’ claims about 
the basic fairness of the post-Uruguay system—both with respect to the 
domestic policies of developed states, and with respect to the sorts of 
accommodations developing countries need from Uruguay Round 
rules. Fairness is relevant to S&D not because S&D involves poor or dis-
advantaged states, but because justice is relevant to any inquiry into the 
structure of trade law.45 The fact that S&D, in particular, is premised on 
inequality, however, does raise speciªc issues of fairness and distributive 
justice in general. Given the fact that the WTO is part of a set of institu-
tions governed by a liberal internationalist vision, it seems appropriate 
to look for criteria of justice and fairness within liberalism itself. I pro-
pose, therefore, to supplement an empirical or pragmatic inquiry with 
a normative evaluation of these issues according to Rawls’s difference 
principle. Does the provision or policy in question operate to make 
economic inequalities work to the beneªt of the least advantaged? If it 
does, then it meets the test for fairness; otherwise, it does not.46
                                                                                                                      
42 Mukerji, supra note 27, at 35. 
43 On the dangers inherent in “governance through ideology” within Bretton Woods 
Institutions, see Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalism’s Discontents, The American Prospect, Jan. 1–
14, 2002. 
44 See McCann, supra note 1, at 292 (“[T]he terms and operation of the WTO regime 
place major restrictions on the policy autonomy of small states without offering any corre-
sponding enhancement of their ability to shape the evolution of the global trade system.”). 
45 See Garcia, supra note 1, at 67–86. 
46 For a fuller statement of this approach, see generally Garcia, supra note 1. See also 
Joel P. Trachtman, Legal Aspects of a Poverty Agenda at the WTO: Trade Law and “Global Apart-
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B. Restoring the Fundamentals 
 With this reorientation in mind, I will maintain that S&D, as it 
emerged from the Uruguay Round, suffers from serious normative and 
pragmatic problems. In other words, aspects of post-Uruguay Round 
S&D are unfair, ineffective, or both. These two criticisms can be made 
with respect to speciªc aspects of all three core elements of S&D: mar-
ket access, market protection, and technical assistance. Although post-
Uruguay Round S&D retained these three core elements, they were 
changed in important ways, and their implementation has suffered 
from serious deªciencies. 
1. Market Access 
 In tandem with a renewed focus on development instead of ad-
justment, as a matter of basic fairness, developing countries must con-
tinue to focus on addressing the obstacles to effective market access. 
There is nothing special or differential about expecting fair treat-
ment. Developing countries must evaluate the fairness of two broad 
market access issues: the obstacles maintained in the domestic policies 
of developed states and the defective terms of their preferential mar-
ket access programs. 
a. Domestic Policies of Developed States 
 One of the most glaring fairness problems in the current WTO 
system involves the tremendous level of protection that developed 
countries maintain in sectors such as agriculture and textiles.47 These 
sectors are important to developing countries, because many have a 
legitimate comparative advantage in such industries. However, devel-
oped country mercantilism in this area stymies market access for such 
products, despite economic evidence to the contrary. 
 For these reasons, a key goal for developing countries in the Doha 
Round will be to secure enforceable commitments on the part of de-
veloped countries, such as the United States and those in the European 
Union (EU), to dismantle their agriculture and textile regimes. This 
will involve commitments to eliminate or, at least, substantially reduce 
domestic agricultural subsidies for key developing-country exports. 
This will also require the progressive elimination of textile quotas and 
                                                                                                                      
heid,” J. Int’l Econ. L. (2003) (WTO has essential role to play in addressing poverty as a 
primary agenda). 
47 See generally Mukerji, supra note 27, at 39–48. 
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the reform of protectionist origin rules such as “ªber-forward,”48 which 
discriminate against efªcient garment industries in developing coun-
tries.49 The collapse of the Cancún Ministerial over just these issues 
does not bode well for negotiation of a fairer market access regime, or 
for the successful completion of the Round.50 Should both be achieved, 
however, the work would not stop after such quotas and rules are 
eliminated. There must be continued monitoring of any developed 
countries’ use of anti-dumping tools and countervailing duties after 
quotas are eliminated. These instruments can be an effective way of 
restoring prior levels of protection, even after the rules have changed.51
 Essentially, developed countries protect these markets because 
their industries in these sectors are not competitive in comparison with 
those of developing countries. For this reason, developed countries re-
sist the dislocation and adjustment that liberalization will bring. How-
ever, maintaining these barriers in the face of contrary economic the-
ory means shifting dislocation and adjustment from developed 
countries to developing countries, which cannot afford this burden. 
Which economy is better situated to absorb the costs of adjustment: 
Dominica with 40,000 citizens or U.S. regional or national economies? 
b. Preferential Market Access 
 Preferential market access, as implemented through GSP-style 
programs, has three main defects that render it deeply ºawed both 
normatively and pragmatically: (1) it is unilateral because it is imple-
mented through discretionary nonbinding programs; (2) it is condi-
tional because compliance or cooperation with a host of nontrade-
related requirements is imposed as a condition of receiving the pref-
erences; and (3) it is limited in scope, with competitive goods exclu-
sions eliminating the most viable sectors from receiving the prefer-
ences.52
                                                                                                                      
48 See generally U.S. Customs Service, NAFTA for Textiles and Textile Articles 
(2000), available at http://www.exportimportlaw.com/FPF/NAFTAtextiles.pdf (discussing 
in the context of NAFTA the operation of rules of origin for textiles). 
49 Stefano Inama, Trade Preferences and the WTO Negotiations on Market Access, 37 J. 
World Trade 959, 968–70 (2003)(citing effect of rules of origin in under-utilization of 
favorable tariff preferences). 
50 Cancun’s Charming Outcome, The Economist, Sept. 20, 2003, at 11–12. 
51 See generally Arie Reich, Institutional and Substantive Reform of the Anti-Dumping and 
Subsidy Agreements, 37 J. World Trade 1037 (2003) (surveying defects in AD/CVD rules 
rendering them susceptible to protectionist abuse). 
52 See generally Garcia, supra note 1. 
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 Pragmatically, the effectiveness of GSP-style market access pro-
grams is open to question. First, their unilateral, conditional, and ex-
clusionary nature erodes their economic value. Their unilateralism 
and conditionality undercut the predictability and reliability of these 
beneªts, rendering them an uncertain incentive to increased domes-
tic and foreign investment. Their exclusionary nature diverts invest-
ment away from the industries enjoying an actual or potential com-
parative advantage and towards industries beneªting solely from 
preference-based efªciencies. 
 Moreover, a larger question as to their enduring value hangs over 
preference programs as a whole.53 As global tariff levels are reduced, 
the marginal value of such preferences declines, cautioning against 
over-reliance on preference programs as the cornerstone for devel-
opment-oriented trade policies in a rapidly liberalizing global trade 
regime.54
 In addition to these pragmatic issues, GSP-style preference pro-
grams suffer from some patent fairness problems. Their unilateral, 
conditional, and exclusionary features exist to accomplish or protect 
important donor country interests, not to enhance the effectiveness of 
the programs for beneªciary countries. Normatively, this turns such 
programs on their head. Instead of being structured so as to beneªt 
the least advantaged, these features actually weaken the capacity of 
such programs to beneªt the least advantaged, in order to protect the 
more advantaged. In this way, the current market access regime fails 
the fundamental test of distributive justice: social policies involving 
resource distribution ought to put wealth and resource disparities at 
work for the beneªt of the least advantaged.55
 In terms of market access, fairness requires nothing less than 
binding, unconditional, and unrestricted access. In Doha, developing 
countries should push for developed countries to commit to binding, 
unconditional, and unrestricted preferential access for all smaller 
economy goods and commodities exports. The Doha mandate already 
calls for duty-free, quota-free access for all products from least devel-
oped countries, coupled with a demand for comprehensive coverage 
                                                                                                                      
53 See Bonapas Onguglo, Developing Countries and Trade Preferences, in Trade Rules in 
the Making 118–20 (Mendoza et. al eds., 1999) (surveying deªciencies in preferential 
trade). 
54 See id. at 120–21. Alternative proposals include more aggressive improvements to ex-
isting preference regimes. See, e.g., Inama, supra note 49, at 974–76 (surveying possible 
structural improvements). 
55 See Garcia, supra note 1, at 156–58. 
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(i.e., no a priori exclusions of competitive goods).56 This exhortation 
offers a starting point, but it is not enough. Already, the EU has initi-
ated a more sweeping proposal, the Everything But Arms initiative.57 
This initiative embraces all products from all developing countries, 
except weapons, and eliminates all duties on those products.58 How-
ever, it is a ºawed proposal because agriculture, the most important 
category, is the slowest to liberalize. Moreover, both the EU and WTO 
initiatives are not couched in the language of binding commitments; 
they are merely another set of discretionary programs. 
 As discussed above, preferential access alone will not work if suc-
cessful implementation only results in developing country exporters 
employing dumping actions. Thus, there is a need to strengthen stan-
dards for dumping actions against developing country exporters.59 
The Doha Implementation Decision does state that members will give 
“particular consideration” to developing country concerns before ini-
tiating textile dumping actions,60 but to what does this really amount? 
Such language is part of a larger problem of enforceability, which will 
be discussed below. 
2. Market Protection 
 The market protection element of S&D suffers from similar prag-
matic and moral failings. For developing countries, the Uruguay Round 
shift to limited nonreciprocity of obligation means that nonreciprocity, 
the key to maintaining a domestic policy space for development-
oriented policies and to protecting their markets from premature 
openness to wholesale competition from developed country industries, 
is now temporary. Developing country ºexibility is limited to only 
whatever additional time was granted for implementing Uruguay 
Round obligations. 
 Pragmatically speaking, the problem is that the transition periods 
have begun to expire, but developing countries are just not ready. It is 
possible that additional time (and money) would solve the problem 
for some agreements such as the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
                                                                                                                      
56 Doha Declaration, supra note 3, ¶ 42. 
57 See Directorate General of Trade, European Commission, Everything But Arms (EBA) 
Initiative, http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/global/gsp/eba/index_en.htm (last vis-
ited Apr. 1, 2004). 
58 Id. 
59 See Reich, supra note 51. 
60 Implementation Decision, supra note 4, ¶ 4.2. 
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Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement),61 but granting that time 
presents other difªculties. Currently, the WTO agreements in ques-
tion call for developing countries to individually request that time, 
without clearly stipulating the substantive criteria whereby such time 
would be granted and the amount of time determined.62 For other 
agreements, such as the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS),63 it is not clear that developing countries would ever be 
ready to face unprotected competition, even with longer transition 
periods. Yet there is no mechanism for permanent nonreciprocity as 
was formerly possible, which means that, ultimately, all development 
space is on a timetable to elimination. 
 The problem of limited nonreciprocity raises a fundamental fair-
ness problem as well, which harks back to basic Aristotelian notions of 
distributive justice. In his Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle clariªed a ba-
sic element of distributive justice: just as equals are to be treated 
equally, unequals are also to be treated unequally.64 The limited form 
of post-Uruguay Round nonreciprocity reduces the challenge of treat-
ing unequals unequally to a matter of additional time. This raises two 
problems. First, there is the risk that unequals will be treated in-
sufªciently unequally if additional time is the only concession to their 
inequality, because additional time by itself may not be enough to re-
spond to the nature and degree of inequality involved. Second, there 
is the risk that unequals have already been treated insufªciently un-
equally with respect to the amount of time (i.e., insufªcient additional 
time may have been granted). As implementation periods expire and 
developing countries face the full force of competition from the de-
veloped world, the WTO must confront the likelihood that, in fact, 
unequals are being treated as if they were equals, which is a basic vio-
lation of fairness.65
 How should the issue of nonreciprocity be addressed in the Doha 
Round? There has been talk of returning the WTO to a two-tier struc-
                                                                                                                      
61 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], An-
nex 1A, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) 
[hereinafter SCM Agreement]. 
62 See Garcia, supra note 1, at 179–81 (discussing defects in extension procedure). 
63 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra 
note 61, Annex 1B, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 
1125 (1994) [hereinafter GATS]. 
64 See Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, in Introduction to Aristotle 402–04 (Richard 
McKeon ed., 1974). 
65 See Garcia, supra note 1, at 175, 181–82. 
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ture, which would restore full nonreciprocity of obligation for develop-
ing countries. However, this is politically unlikely given the concerted 
push by developed countries to establish the single-undertaking con-
cept in the ªrst place and the fact that the Doha Declaration reafªrms 
this approach. Nevertheless, the current form of a limited de facto two-
tier system, established by nonreciprocity of implementation, can be 
improved. At Doha, developing countries did record an important suc-
cess in this regard by securing an agreement among WTO members to 
extend the implementation period for the SCM Agreement, thus, pre-
serving ºexibility in the key development policy area of subsidies.66 
However, this does not address the broader problem. 
 The current form of limited nonreciprocity involves across-the- 
board, politically negotiated transition periods with individual ad hoc 
extension opportunities. This puts individual developing countries 
seeking extensions in a weak position and does not link the grant of 
time to underlying economic realities. One proposal from developing 
countries in the WTO Committee on Trade and Development (CTD) 
has been to impose substantive criteria for transition periods in the 
place of purely political bargaining. Such criteria could link additional 
time, and the amount of time, to objective economic criteria (such as 
debt level, industrial development level, and human development in-
dex) and social criteria (such as literacy and life expectancy rates).67 
The EU has also proposed, for example, that additional time be linked 
to stepped-up capacity building efforts and that extensions be granted 
and renewed until there can be demonstrated success in such capacity 
building efforts.68 African states have gone even further and proposed 
a perpetual right to extensions of time upon notice to the relevant 
WTO body.69 This goes furthest towards granting full ºexibility but 
raises competing concerns over the potential for abuse of this exten-
sion right. 
 Since the Doha Declaration already reafªrms that the Doha 
agreements should take into account the principles in the Enabling 
Clause and Part IV of the GATT, it seems that the ªrst priority would 
                                                                                                                      
66 Developing countries should nevertheless press for an exemption for new agricultural 
export subsidies, which both the SCM and Agriculture Agreements prohibit. They should 
also press for a new category of development-related subsidies in the SCM Agreement. 
67 General Council, Proposal for a Framework Agreement on Special and Differential Treat-
ment, WT/GC/W/442, ¶ 15 (Sept. 19, 2001). 
68 CTD, Communication from the EC, TN/CTD/W/13, ¶¶ 4–6, 12–13 (Aug. 1, 2002). 
69 CTD, Joint Communication from the African Group in the WTO-Revision, TN/CTD/ 
W/3/Rev.1, ¶¶ 23–24 ( June 24, 2002). 
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be to reafªrm the centrality of the full principle of nonreciprocity to 
WTO trade and development policy. Developing countries need to be 
able to protect their economies from the force of full competition, 
while at the same time pursuing both foreign investment and prefer-
ence-based trade (while it lasts). The Enabling Clause clearly enumer-
ated a series of principles that created for developing countries the 
freedom and ºexibility to pursue development-oriented trade policies 
that might violate trade orthodoxy. Re-emphasizing the centrality of 
this principle would supply the framework within which both the sub-
stantive criteria and EU proposals could be adopted. 
 Another important goal is for developing countries to protect 
agricultural self-sufªciency. For developing countries, as well as for 
developed countries, agriculture is about more than food. Employ-
ment in the agricultural sector still plays an important role in develop-
ing countries’ employment policies. Moreover, rural agricultural em-
ployment is important to easing the pressure on their urban areas. 
For these reasons, developing countries should continue to pursue a 
“development box” exemption in the WTO Agreement on Agricul-
ture, permitting them to employ tariffs and nontariff barriers for food 
security crops.70 They should also press for continued exemption 
from WTO actions on food security items in view of the expiration of 
the Agriculture Agreement’s peace clause in 2003. 
 Many of these measures are not consistent with a pure free trade 
economic model or with the WTO’s current ideological stance. How-
ever, the focus should not be on ideological purity but on effective-
ness and distortion. If such measures are effective in the near future, 
then they will play an important role until other and more efªcient 
industries can be developed. Moreover, given that the trade volumes 
involved are not large when compared to global trade, developing 
country implementation of protection-based development strategies 
would not signiªcantly distort world trade, especially when compared 
to the agriculture policies of the developed world. 
3. Technical Assistance 
 Another key element of development is aid, which in the trade 
arena comes in the form of technical assistance. In many respects, 
                                                                                                                      
70 See generally Thomas C. Beierle, From Uruguay to Doha: Agricultural Trade 
Negotiations at the World Trade Organization (Resources for the Future, Discus-
sion Paper No. 02-13, 2002), available at http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-DP-02-
13.pdf. 
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technical assistance was supposed to be the white knight of the post-
Uruguay Round S&D regime. Developed states were supposed to de-
liver the funds and knowledge needed to allow developing economies 
to implement these new and costly Uruguay Round regimes in the 
additional time granted. The moral imperative for technical assistance 
is clear: those possessing a disparity of trade-related knowledge could 
justify this disparity by placing such knowledge, and the funds to pay 
for it, in the service of the less-advantaged.71
 Practically, the technical assistance aspects of the Uruguay Round 
have largely failed.72 Due in part to the “best efforts” nature of many 
technical assistance provisions,73 delivery of technical assistance has 
been sporadic and under-funded. WTO Members did adopt the so-
called Integrated Framework,74 which was supposed to streamline and 
rationalize the technical assistance and capacity building efforts of 
wealthier states. However, this program has been judged a failure due 
to turf battles among participating institutions and a lack of adequate 
funding.75
 The issue has come up again in Doha, in the form of proposals for 
a special fund for least developed countries.76 However, this would only 
involve pledges, and existing funding is minimal.77 This tepid level of 
response is particularly disappointing, given the fact that the primary 
need for technical assistance is driven by the obligation to implement 
the complex new trade regimes that the wealthy states sought from the 
developing states in the Uruguay Round in the ªrst place. 
C. Enforce the Bargain: Make S&D More Precise, Effective, and Operational 
 The Doha Reform Agenda includes as a “cross-cutting issue” a 
charge to the CTD to make S&D provisions “more precise, effective 
and operational.”78 This mandate comes in response to the problem of 
                                                                                                                      
71 For a fuller exposition of this imperative, see Garcia, supra note 1, at 188–90. 
72 See Fukasaku, supra note 24, at 18–19. 
73 See infra Part II.C.1 for examples of “best endeavor” clauses. 
74 See World Trade Organization, The Integrated Framework for Least Developed 
Countries, at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/teccop_e/if_e.htm (last visited Apr. 
15, 2004). 
75 See Subcommittee on LDCs, Progress Report on the Integrated Framework for Trade-Related 
Technical Assistance, Report by the Director General, WT/LDC/SWG/IF/17/Rev.1 (Apr. 17, 
2001). 
76 Id. 
77 See Bhala, supra note 5, at 166. 
78 Doha Declaration, supra note 3, ¶ 44. 
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the unenforceability of S&D language in the Uruguay Round agree-
ments, one of the failures of the Uruguay Round bargain. S&D has a 
ªrm legal basis in pre-WTO legal instruments, yet most of its provisions, 
including several cornerstones such as preferential trade, are not le-
gally binding. This is an example in international trade law of the 
broader problem of the use of hortatory or aspirational language in 
international agreements involving developing countries. In the WTO, 
as the full implications of this problem became clear post-Uruguay 
Round, developing countries grew increasingly frustrated, judging that 
they had been tricked with respect to the extent of what they had been 
promised in Uruguay Round, which also helped to derail the Seattle 
Ministerial. 
 The charge to the CTD is therefore part of addressing the unªn-
ished business of the Uruguay Round, by revisiting the S&D provi-
sions of the various Uruguay Round agreements and proposing 
changes to existing S&D provisions that might render such provisions 
“more precise, effective and operational.” As part of this mandate, the 
CTD is to consider “the legal and practical implications for developed 
and developing Members of converting special and differential treat-
ment measures into mandatory provisions.”79
 The CTD has met several times in Special Session, under the lead-
ership of Ambassador Ransford Smith of Jamaica, to consider various 
communications from Members proposing changes to existing S&D 
provisions. Despite the Committee’s current deadlock on this issue, it is 
vital that developing countries identify and prioritize the provisions that 
are suitable, both substantively and politically, for such revision. 
1. Language of Existing S&D Provisions 
 Recall that the WTO has identiªed 145 S&D provisions through-
out the WTO Agreements that are divided into six categories based 
on their function.80 In terms of the problem of enforceability, these 
provisions can instead be divided according to the nature of the lan-
guage used to express the relevant level of trade obligation. This 
method of organization might be more useful for the decision as to 
whether and how to make these provisions mandatory. 
 When divided according to language, existing provisions fall into 
four categories: 
                                                                                                                      
79 Id. ¶ 12.1. 
80 See CTD, S&D Provisions, supra note 23, ¶ 3. 
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(1) provisions employing purely discretionary language; 
(2) “best endeavor” clauses; 
(3) de facto nonbinding or “fake mandatory” provisions; and 
(4) mandatory provisions. 
The discretionary provisions employ language that is only permissive 
and that does not purport to create any obligation, moral or legal. An 
example would be paragraph 1 of the Enabling Clause, which states 
that “contracting parties may accord differential and more favorable 
treatment to developing countries.”81 This language quite speciªcally 
authorizes such treatment, and the most-favored nation violation it 
constitutes, without requiring parties to accord it such treatment. 
 “Best endeavor” clauses, which are quite prevalent in the WTO 
Agreements, express what might be termed a “moral” obligation on 
Members to “try their best.” For example, in Article 9 of the Agreement 
on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), “Members 
agree to facilitate the provision of technical assistance to other Members, 
especially developing country Members” with respect to SPS compli-
ance.82 Similarly, GATT Article XXXVII.1 urges developed contracting 
parties to accord “to the fullest extent possible . . . a high priority to the re-
duction and elimination of barriers to products . . . of . . . interest to 
less-developed contracting parties.”83 Lest this language be thought to 
be an anachronism conªned to the GATT era or the Uruguay Round, 
the Doha Decision itself employs such language. For example, the Min-
isterial Conference “urges” Members to exercise restraint before chal-
lenging rural development/food security measures.84
 De facto nonbinding or “fake mandatory” provisions are a sub-
category of “best endeavor” clauses, and they are the most complex in 
their legal effect. These provisions employ words of a mandatory na-
ture but, due to their overall structure, achieve no actual binding le-
gal effect. One example, drawn from the Doha Implementation Deci-
sion, states that Members “will exercise particular consideration” before 
initiating anti-dumping actions against developing country textile ex-
                                                                                                                      
81 Enabling Clause, supra note 16, para. 1 (emphasis added). 
82 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 
1994, art. 9.1, WTO Agreement, supra note 61, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments—Results 
of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) (emphasis added) [hereinafter SPS 
Agreement]. 
83 GATT, supra note 12, art. XXXVII.1 (emphasis added). 
84 Implementation Decision, supra note 4, ¶ 2.1 (emphasis added). 
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ports that were formerly under quota.85 “Will” is a mandatory word, 
but since “particular consideration” is not deªned, the provision by 
itself attains no binding substantive legal effect. 
 The SPS Agreement provides another example. Article 10.1 dic-
tates that Members “shall take account of the special needs of develop-
ing country Members” in the preparation and application of SPS 
measures.86 “Shall” is the classic word of binding obligation in inter-
national treaties, but since “take account of” is not deªned, the provi-
sion by itself attains no binding substantive legal effect. 
 Finally, we come to truly mandatory provisions, which use lan-
guage creating concrete, enforceable commitments. For example, Ar-
ticle 27.2.b of the SCM Agreement gives developing country Members 
eight years to eliminate export subsidies.87 This language was recently 
the subject of a WTO dispute involving Brazilian aircraft, in which the 
panel conªrmed that eight years was eight years.88
 Although several existing S&D provisions are of a truly mandatory 
nature, the general state of the language of S&D obligations as sur-
veyed here is troubling. The substantial majority of existing S&D provi-
sions are either discretionary, “best endeavor,” or de facto nonbinding 
in nature. Legally, this means that most of the provisions upon which 
developing Members seek to rely are either unenforceable (“may”), or 
employ vague or undeªned standards (“take account of”) with other-
wise mandatory language (“shall”). Politically, this has contributed to 
the sense, expressed by many developing Members, that what they be-
lieved they had been promised as part of the Uruguay Round package 
of negotiated concessions has not in fact been delivered. 
2. Proposed Changes to Existing S&D Provisions 
 The CTD is charged in Special Session to consider ways to make 
S&D provisions “more precise, effective and operational”—by, in part, 
exploring the legal and practical implications of rendering such pro-
visions mandatory—and to report to the General Council its recom-
mendations as to which provisions could and should be made manda-
                                                                                                                      
85 See id. ¶ 4.2 (emphasis added). 
86 SPS Agreement, supra note 82, art. 10.1 (emphasis added). 
87 SCM Agreement, supra note 61, art. 27.2.b. 
88 See WTO Report of the Panel, Brazil—Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, 
WT/DS46/R, ¶¶ 4.157, 7.49–.51 (Apr. 14, 1999). The case involved the right of developing 
Members to provide subsidies for an eight-year period under Article 27 of the SCM 
Agreement. See id. 
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tory.89 Certain S&D provisions could in fact be made “more precise, 
effective and operational” through amending their language into a 
more binding form. Speciªcally, the CTD should consider two types 
of changes: 
(1) changing purely discretionary terms into mandatory terms; and 
(2) changing de facto nonbinding provisions into truly mandatory 
provisions. 
 With respect to existing S&D provisions that are couched in 
purely discretionary terms, some of these provisions can be rendered 
more effective and operational by changing a term of discretion into 
a term of obligation. Often, this will constitute changing the word 
“may” to “shall.” 
 It should be pointed out, however, that not all discretionary pro-
visions are suitable for this approach. For example, with respect to 
paragraph 1 of the Enabling Clause, changing the word “may” to the 
word “shall” raises many complex issues concerning what exactly has 
been promised with respect to the many sub-sections of paragraph 
1.90 Thus, a simple across-the-board approach of changing all “mays” 
to “shalls” might not be effective or appropriate. 
 With respect to the many “best endeavor” clauses, there is a sec-
ond, more fundamental reason why merely changing a discretionary 
word to a word of obligation will not by itself render the provision more 
effective and operational. Characteristically, “best endeavor” clauses 
contain language exhorting Members to some vague level of care or 
attention. To make such provisions more “precise, effective and opera-
tional,” the exhortation in such provisions must also be amended to 
substitute a justiciable standard. For example, in the Doha Implemen-
tation Decision, Members are urged with respect to agriculture to “exer-
cise restraint” before challenging rural development/food security 
measures.91 Changing this language to require Members to exercise re-
straint has the appearance of making the provisions mandatory, but as 
is the case with “best endeavor” clauses, this appearance is deceiving. 
 The problem lies with the use of the phrase “exercise restraint.” 
What does this mean? How would this be interpreted and enforced by 
a WTO panel? If the CTD is to make such provisions truly more “pre-
cise, effective and operational,” the phrase “exercise restraint” cannot 
                                                                                                                      
89 Implementation Decision, supra note 4, ¶ 12.1. 
90 See Enabling Clause, supra note 16, para. 1. 
91 Implementation Decision, supra note 4, ¶ 2.1 (emphasis added). 
314 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 27:291 
be left as it stands. What criteria are to limit a Member’s discretion to 
challenge a green box measure? What ªndings must be made? What 
facts must be obtained? What procedural steps must be observed? 
These are the sorts of questions that must be asked, and the answers 
drafted into the provision, for such provisions to be rendered more 
“precise, effective and operational.” 
 Two further examples can be drawn from the speciªc proposals 
India made in its communication on this subject to the CTD.92 With 
respect to Article 4.10 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU), which currently reads that “[d]uring consultations Members 
should give special attention” to developing country Members’ “particular 
problems and interests,”93 India proposes two changes. India ªrst pro-
poses that the word “should” be replaced by “shall” so as to make this 
provision mandatory.94 While it is formally correct that this change 
would make the provision mandatory, such a change by itself would not 
be enough to make it “more precise, effective or operational,” for the 
reasons concerning “best endeavor” clauses discussed above. 
 For this reason, India proposes another change with respect to 
this language, namely a deªnition of “special attention,”95 which has 
the effect of translating this vague standard into a requirement for an 
evidentiary showing, similar to the allocation of a burden of proof in 
panel proceedings. India proposes, for example, that if the complain-
ing party is a developed Member, that Member should be required to 
“explain in the panel request as well as in its submissions to the panel 
as to how it had taken or paid special attention.”96
 India’s proposal to deªne “special attention” reºects its experi-
ence in the Bed Linen case.97 That case concerned the WTO Anti-
Dumping Agreement, which in Article 15 states that the possibility of 
“constructive remedies . . . shall be explored”98 before imposing anti-
                                                                                                                      
92 CTD, Communication from India, TN/CTD/W/6 ( June 17, 2002) [hereinafter Com-
munication from India]. 
93 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 
Apr. 15, 1994, art. 4.10, WTO Agreement, supra note 61, Annex 2, Legal Instruments—
Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) (emphasis added) [hereinafter 
DSU]. 
94 Communication from India, supra note 92, at 3. 
95 Id. at 3–4. 
96 Id. at 4. 
97 WTO Appellate Body Report on European Communities—Anti-Dumping Duties on 
Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India, WT/DS141/R (Oct. 30, 2000). 
98 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 15, WTO Agreement, supra note 61, Annex 1A, Legal In-
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dumping duties. India contended that the EU had violated the 
Agreement by failing to explore such remedies prior to imposing a 
duty, and the panel entered a ªnding to this effect.99
 The second illustration from India’s Communication concerns 
Article 21.2 of the DSU. This provision urges that, in a panel’s surveil-
lance of the implementation of its rulings, “[p]articular attention should 
be paid” to matters affecting developing Members’ interests.100 First, 
India proposes that “should” be changed to “shall” to render the obli-
gation mandatory.101 Second, India proposes a carefully articulated 
set of timetables to operationalize the phrase “particular attention.”102
 India’s approach with respect to Article 21.2 thus goes further 
than its approach with respect to Article 4.10, since it proposes sub-
stantive criteria rather than simply the requirement that a party make 
an evidentiary showing. A weakness of the evidentiary approach is 
that, because it does not impose a substantive standard, a party can 
meet the requirement by showing it has “paid special attention” with-
out the need to show it has adequately addressed the developing 
Member’s needs. In this sense, it is like an obligation “to negotiate in 
good faith”—not an obligation to reach an agreement. For this rea-
son, where possible the CTD should adopt the approach taken by In-
dia with respect to Article 21.2 and propose justiciable standards. 
Conclusion 
 In tailoring the post-Uruguay Round system to meet their needs 
more effectively, developing countries must address serious market 
access problems due to the ºaws in preferential trade policy and the 
obstacles developing countries face in key export markets such as ag-
riculture and textiles. Moreover, in addressing such issues as imple-
                                                                                                                      
struments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) (emphasis added) 
[hereinafter Anti-Dumping Agreement]. 
99 This experience suggests a positive role for judicial elaboration of enforceable stan-
dards in interpreting weak S&D language. However, while this is a notable success for India 
and for developing Members generally with respect to the enforceability of S&D provi-
sions, it should not be taken to mean that “best endeavor” clauses of this sort are now 
clearly enforceable without further change. Since there is, formally speaking, no stare 
decisis in WTO case law, the Bed Linen decision has no binding effect in formal terms on 
the interpretation of any other similar provision in any future proceedings before a WTO 
panel. Therefore, the need for the sort of amendment India proposes for Article 4.10 of 
the DSU remains unaffected. 
100 DSU, supra note 93, art. 21.2 (emphasis added). 
101 Communication from India, supra note 92, at 4. 
102 Id. 
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mentation periods for new Uruguay Round disciplines, there needs to 
be some proportionality between the time granted for implementa-
tion and the ability of developing countries to withstand such disci-
plines. Dismantling such obstacles and securing such additional time, 
and the technical assistance and funding needed to make such time 
meaningful, is not about charity or welfare; rather, such action con-
cerns the basic fairness of the international trade law system. Finally, 
developing countries must push through the necessary reforms to  
address the weaknesses in Uruguay Round S&D language. 
 Developing countries need to go further if the Doha Round is to 
succeed in addressing their trade and development concerns. There 
needs to be a new focus for WTO trade and development policy, built 
around addressing system-wide fairness issues and restoring as far as 
possible the premium on development ºexibility through the full 
principle of nonreciprocity. Perhaps the most effective reorientation 
of global economic law and policy around the twin imperatives of de-
velopment and fairness will come only with the implementation of a 
more fully developed form of global wealth redistribution,103 whether 
through some form of taxation scheme or through radically increased 
development aid.104 However, the institutional and political obstacles 
to such policies are daunting for the time being. 
 In the near term, developing countries need a comprehensive 
agreement on S&D to emerge from the Doha Round. Such an agree-
ment should do the following: 
(1) clarify that development is the number one economic policy goal 
of developing countries, and that the WTO is bound to support 
developing countries in their pursuit of this goal; and 
(2) state the basic principles for guiding trade and development pol-
icy in the WTO: 
 • fairness in economic relations, 
 • domestic policy space for development through meaningful 
nonreciprocity, 
 • binding, unconditional preferential market access, 
                                                                                                                      
103 Trade law already plays a redistributive role, for example, through S&D. See Garcia, 
supra note 1 (discussing distributive aspects of preferential trade policy). 
104 See Garcia, supra note 1, at 207–10 (arguing for the move to more explicitly redis-
tributive policies as the next generation of trade and development policy). See generally Jon 
Mandle, Globalization and Justice, 570 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 126 (2000) ( just 
globalization requires wealth redistribution); Trachtman, supra note 46 (need for institu-
tional reform in international law to support redistributive obligations). 
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 • “precise, effective and operational” S&D provisions, and 
 • adequately funded technical assistance. 
 Under traditional trade theory, subsidies and other measures 
adopted by developing countries under this approach might be con-
sidered bad policy. However, the primary moving force behind the 
Doha Round is the recognition that the current ideological approach 
to free trade is not working. The fundamental question, then, is what 
should be done in response? Should the developed WTO members 
continue to force liberalization on ideological grounds? Should the 
WTO return to a two-tier structure or otherwise enact a system of 
permanent subsidization as a form of international welfare? 
 There are no simple answers, and better prescriptions await reso-
lution of the current disarray within development economics. How-
ever, the Doha Round cannot be delayed until economists can come 
up with a new consensus that will reliably indicate the route to growth 
and employment for smaller economies in the current economic and 
policy climate. For this reason, the WTO should seriously consider 
restoring the status quo, in line with the physician’s maxim: “First, do 
no harm.” 
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